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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
Appeal: 
1. Did the District Court err in granting the Defendants-
Respondents1 Motion For Summary Judgment? 
2. Did the District Court err in failing to apply a stan-
dard of substantial compliance with the relevant statute 
regarding the execution of testamentary documents? 
3. Did the District Court err in granting Defendants-
Respondents1 Motion For Attorneys1 Fees? 
4. Did the District Court err in failing to make specific 
findings of fact with regard to the Defendants-Respondents1 
Motion For Attorneys1 Fees on the basis of alleged bad faith 
conduct or other conduct violating Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Wendell E. Taylor commenced this action to invalidate a 
document entitled the Last Will And Testament of Grant R. Taylor 
dated August 30, 1984 and, to give effect to the provisions of a 
document dated June 30, 1984, executed by Grant R. Taylor and 
witnessed by Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine Taylor (R. 2-6). By 
the terms of the June 30, 1984 document, Grant R. Taylor agreed 
to forgive a substantial debt owed him by Wendell E. Taylor (R. 
104). 
Defendants initially responded to Plaintiff's Complaint by 
1 
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filing a Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint With Prejudice 
(R. 8). This Motion was never heard by the district court. 
After the completion of some discovery, Defendants filed a Motion 
For Summary Judgment, and a Motion For Attorneys Fees (R, 132, 
200). On or about March 24, 1986, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
entered an order granting Defendants1 Motion For Summary 
Judgment, dismissing the action with prejudice and awarding 
Defendants attorneys' fees (R. 235, 236). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wendell E. Taylor, hereinafter "Wendell" was the brother of 
Grant R. Taylor, hereinafter "decedent". Decedent died on 
September 26, 1984 (R.3, 99, 100, 101). In January of 1984, 
decedent had loaned Wendell a significant amount of money 
enabling Wendell to avoid a financial problem associated with 
his residence (R. 102, 104). 
On June 30, 1984, decedent dictated a document to another of 
his brothers, Noel M. Taylor, which cancelled the debt owed him 
by Wendell (R. 3, 12, 104). After the document was typed and 
read back to the decedent by Noel M. Taylor, and in the presence 
of Noel's wife, Geraldine, decedent executed it in the presence 
of Noel and Geraldine Taylor (R. 168, 169, 176, 188). Thereafter, 
Noel M. Taylor signed the document as a witness in the presence 
of his wife Geraldine J. Taylor and decedent (R. 168, 169, 176, 
188, 189). Geraldine J. Taylor did not execute this document at 
this time (R. 188). However, Mrs. Taylor did sign the document 
in the capacity of a witness on a subsequent date (R. 191-192). 
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The June 30/ 1984 document cancelling the debt owed by 
Wendell to the decedent was intended by decedent to be a portion 
of the decedent's final will and testament (R. 104). The dece-
dent intended that the document supercede any previous or sub-
sequent order of his, or anyone else, with regard to the 
decedent's estate (R. 104). 
The decedent created and executed this June 30, 1984 docu-
ment because he believed "that in the presence of certain people 
and by their instruction, future written negotiations may be 
attempted to be made while I am under the influence of medicines 
or coercion and not of my clear, free and sober desires. This I 
deeply and positively believe could or will happen." (R. 104). 
On or about August 30, 1984, decedent executed a document 
entitled Last Will and Testament. This document made no provi-
sion for Defendant Esther Taylor to inherit any of decedent's 
estate. (R. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81). On or about August 27, 1984, 
decedent created a revocable trust known as the Grant R. Taylor 
Trust (R. 41-65, 78). This trust was amended on September 21, 
1984 (R. 66-76). 
Decedent and Defendant Esther Taylor were divorced in 
December of 1983. This divorce was an extremely bitter one (R. 
100). Notwithstanding this bitter divorce, they were allegedly 
remarried on September 21, 1984, only nine months after the 
divorce, the same date the revocable trust was amended to pro-
vide for Esther, and five days prior to the decedent's death 
from cancer (R. 66-76, 100, 105, 107). 
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On the date of his remarriage to Esther Taylor, September 
21, 1984, decedent was on his deathbed, suffering from cancer and 
was unable to walk or speak audibly. Decedent had been extremely 
ill with cancer for at least one month prior to this date (R. 
100, 109), In fact, in a letter to the Marriage License Bureau 
on September 20, 1984, Dr. Edward G. Jenkins, decedent's son-in-
law, stated that decedent was "very ill with a serious medical 
condition" which did not allow him out of bed. (R. 109). 
In his Complaint, Wendell has alleged that decedent was men-
tally incompetent and incapable due to his terminal illness for 
at least sixty (60) days prior to his death (R. 3). Wendell 
further alleged that during this sixty day period of incompetence, 
the Defendants, Esther Taylor, Darren G. Taylor and John Does 1-5 
wrongfully and maliciously manipulated decedent with regard to 
the preparation of trust and will documents and further, exer-
cised undue influence over decedent in connection with his pur-
ported remarriage of Defendant Esther Taylor so as to obtain an 
advantage for her from his estate. According to the Complaint, 
decedent would not have prepared these various documents or 
remarried Esther Taylor if he had been in full control of his 
faculties at that time (R. 2, 3, 4, 5). The decedent was con-
cerned that as his terminal illness progressed and as stronger 
medication was required in connection with this illness, "certain 
people" would attempt to exercise undue influence over him with 
regard to his estate and assets (R. 104). 
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Wendell's relationship with the decedent had been amicable 
and brotherly (R. 102). Wendell's relationship with Defendant 
Esther Taylor, however, had been extremely hostile for some years 
prior to decedent's death (R. 101, 102). 
Wendell did not learn of the existence of the June 30, 1984 
document until January or February of 1985. At that time he was 
provided with a copy of it by his brother Noel M. Taylor (R. 169, 
171). This document's existence was not brought to Wendell's 
attention earlier due to the specific directions of the decedent 
as set out in the document (R. 104). 
The decedent left instructions with his "benefactors" that 
all financial obligations owed him by Wendell were to be can-
celled at his death (R. 104). He was, however, concerned that 
his wishes in this regard would not be carried out (R. 104). He 
therefore stated in the June 30, 1984 document: 
. . ."I handle this subject this way in the 
hopes that the principal desire of mine to 
be consummated is that Wendell will be free 
of financial obligations to me and/or my 
estate. I handle it with you Noel so that if 
all goes as I desire and as instructed by me 
that this document be destroyed without revela-
tion. I suggest to you Noel a short period 
of waiting after my passing to present this 
document, if needed, in order to see an accurate 
picture of the developments if a problem arises 
ii 
. . . . 
(R. 104). 
He also included a provision whereby Wendell was to "be compen-
sated in treble for all expenses, legal and ordinary, he incurred 
or will incur in resisting the dwelling debt problem as well as 
5 
the cancelled debt." (R. 104). 
Noel M. Taylor did not become aware that Wendell was having 
a problem with Defendant Esther Taylor regarding his home until 
January or February of 1985 (R. 171, 176, 177). When he became 
aware of Wendell's difficulties, Noel was unable to locate the 
original June 30, 1984 document (R. 173, 174, 175, 176). Noel 
Taylor located the original June 30, 1984 document and gave it to 
Wendell sometime in the Spring of 1985 (R. 174, 175, 176, 191). 
In October of 1985, Wendell commenced this action in the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County to enforce the terms of 
the June 30, 1984 document (R. 2). When this action was ini-
tially commenced, Wendell's attorney at the time, Stanley S. 
Adams, mistakenly attached to the Complaint a copy of the June 
30, 1984 document bearing only the signatures of decedent and 
Noel M. Taylor (R. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 99, 100). 
On or about March 24, 1986, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
Third District Court Judge, granted Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment Dismissing Action With Prejudice And Awarding 
Defendants Attorneys Fees (R. 235, 236). The District Court made 
no finding that Wendell's action lacked merit or that Plaintiff's 
conduct in bringing the suit was lacking in good faith (R. 235, 
236). Further, the District Court made no finding that the 
Plaintiff or his counsel had violated any of the terms of Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 235, 236). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Genuine issues of fact exist with regard to the 
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influence exerted over decedent by Defendants and the decedent's 
competence for a period of thirty to sixty days prior to dece-
dent's death. 
A. Decedent was concerned about the exercise of undue 
influence over him as his terminal illness 
progressed (R. 104). 
B. Decedent was aware that his mental and physical con-
dition was deteriorating and therefore the exercise 
of undue influence over him was possible. 
C. The District Court made no findings of fact with 
regard to the decedent's mental competence for a 
period of thirty to sixty days prior to his death. 
D. The District Court made no findings of fact with 
regard to the Plaintiff's allegations of undue 
influence exercised by Defendants over the decedent. 
E. The District Court made no findings of fact as to 
the Plaintiff's standing to challenge the validity 
of decedent's August 30, 1984 will and revocable 
trust agreements. 
P. Plaintiff is an "interested person" as defined by 
U.C.A. § 75-1-201. 
2. Decedent substantially complied with the provisions of 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code with regard to the execution of the 
June 30f 1984 will/codicil. 
A. The June 30, 1984 will/codicil was executed by the 
Decedent in the presence of two witnesses, 
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Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine J. Taylor. 
B. Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine J. Taylor acted as wit-
nesses of this document at the decedent's request. 
C. Subsequent to the decedent's execution of the June 
30, 1984 will/codicil, Noel M. Taylor executed the 
document as a witness in the presence of decedent, 
Grant R. Taylor. 
D. Although Geraldine J. Taylor did not execute the 
June 30, 1984 will/codicil in the presence of the 
decedent, she did execute the document confirming 
that she had witnessed the execution of the June 30, 
1984 will/codicil. 
E. The execution of the June 30, 1984 will/codicil 
substantially complied with the terms of U.C.A. 
§ 75-2-502 so as to provide protection against 
fraud. 
F. The Utah Uniform Probate Code is to be liberally 
construed so as to discover and give effect to the 
intent of the testator in the distribution of his 
estate. 
3. The Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorneys 
fees pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
U.C.A. § 78-27-56. 
A. The District Court failed to make any findings that 
there was wilfull violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, by the Plaintiff or his attorney 
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which would give rise to an award of attorneys fees 
or other sanctions under that rule. 
B. The District Court failed to make any findings of 
fact with regard to the Plaintiff's alleged intent 
to defeat the purpose of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
C. The District Court made no findings of fact as to 
whether or not Plaintiff's claim lacked merit as 
defined in Utah law. 
D. The District Court failed to make any findings of 
fact that the Plaintiff's claim was not asserted in 
good faith. 
E. There is not substantial evidence in the record to 
support an award of attorneys fees against the 
Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants pursuant to 
either Rule 11f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
U.C.A. § 78-27-56. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GENUINE ISSUES OP MATERIAL FACT EXIST WITH 
REGARD TO DEFENDANTS ESTHER AND DARREN TAYLORS' 
INFLUENCE OVER DECEDENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 
HIS DEATH AND AS TO HIS COMPETENCE FOR A PERIOD 
OF SIXTY DAYS PRIOR TO HIS DEATH. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entitles a 
party to an award of summary judgment only if there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
9 
judgment as a matter of law. See; Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 58 5 (1982), Lockhart Company 
v. Anderson, 646 P*2d 678 (1982), Geneva Pipe Company v. S&H Ins. 
Co., 714 P.2d 648 (1986). In Gadd v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 1041 (1984) 
this court stated: 
"A motion for summary judgment can only be 
granted when 'there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact,1 and 'even assuming 
the facts as asserted by the party moved 
against to be true, he could not prevail.'" 
"Since the party moved against is denied the 
opportunity of presenting his evidence and 
his contentions, it is and should be the 
policy of the courts to act on such motions 
with great caution, to assure that a party 
whose cause might have merit is not deprived 
of the right to access to the courts for 
enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs." 
It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment should 
be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reaso-
nable probability that the party moved against could prevail. 
Frisbee v. K&K Construction Company, 676 P.2d 387 (1984), Snyder 
v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 (1984), Gadd v. Olsen, supra. 
In this case, the very language of the June 30, 1984 docu-
ment showed that the decedent was concerned about the exercise of 
undue influence over him as his serious illness progressed (R. 
104). Assuming all of the facts alleged in Wendell's Complaint 
to be true and considering the clearly stated concerns of the 
decedent as set out in the June 30, 1984 document, genuine issues 
of fact do exist and therefore the granting of Defendants' Motion 
For Summary Judgment by the District court was inappropriate (R. 
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2-6, 104). 
Although no finding was made by the District Court on this 
point, Defendants contend in their Memorandum Of Points And 
Authorities In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment that Wendell lacks standing to challenge the validity 
of decedent's August 30, 1984 will. They base their contention 
upon the premise that Wendell is not an "interested person" as 
defined by U.C.A. § 75-1-201 (20). This statute states: 
"'Interested person1 includes heirs, devisees, 
children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, 
and any others having a property right in or 
claim against a trust estate or the estate of 
a decedent, ward or protected person, which 
may be affected by the proceeding. It also 
includes persons having priority for appoint-
ment as personal representative and other 
fiduciaries representing interested persons. 
The meaning as it relates to particular persons 
may vary from time to time and must be deter-
mined according to the particular purposes of 
and matters involved in, any proceeding." 
In this case, Wendell clearly is an "interested person" as 
defined by this statute. Whether or not the June 30, 1984 docu-
ment is a valid testamentary disposition, it evidences a debt 
owed by Wendell to the decedent. Wendell therefore has a pro-
perty right in or claim against the estate in the determination 
of whether the debt to the estate is cancelled. Further, the 
statute specifically provides for a case by case analysis and 
determination as to who is an interested party in any proceeding. 
Genuine issues of fact exist regarding the allegations of 
Plaintiff's Complaint and Plaintiff's standing to contest dece-
dent's August 30, 1984 will. Therefore, the District Court's 
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Order granting Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment was erro-
neous. 
POINT II 
THE JUNE 30, 1984 WILL AND/OR CODICIL WAS 
PROPERLY EXECUTED IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE NECESSARY REQUISITES OF THE UTAH 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND SHOULD THEREFORE 
BE TREATED AS VALID AND EFFECTIVE ACCORDING 
TO ITS TERMS. 
The requirements for execution of a testamentary document in 
Utah are set forth in U.C.A. § 75-2-502 as follows: 
"Except as provided for holographic wills, 
writings within section 75-2-573, and wills 
within section 75-2-506, every will shall be 
in writing signed by the testator or in the 
testator's name by some other person in the 
testator's presence and by his direction, 
and shall be signed by at least two persons 
each of whom witnessed either the signing 
or the testator's acknowledgment of the 
signature or of the will. The signing by the 
witnesses must be in the testator's presence 
and in the presence of each other." 
This statutory provision was enacted in 1975 and was essentially 
an adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. 
Compliance with the final sentence of the statute is con-
tested by the Defendants in the instant case. Defendants in 
their Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Motion 
For Summary Judgment note that the purpose of such a provision is 
to guard against fraud. (See; Defendants' Memorandum In Support 
Of Motion For Summary Judgment, pg. 9; 94 CJS Section Wills 189). 
Defendants then rely on the language used by the Utah Supreme 
Court in In Re Alexander's Estate, 139 P.2d 432 (Utah 1943). In 
that case, the court stated: 
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"The right to dispose of property by will 
is governed and controlled entirely by 
statute. Such statutes are mandatory, andf 
unless strictly complied with, the instru-
ment, as a will, is void." 
139 P.2d at 434. 
Although the above quoted language provides for no excep-
tion, Plaintiff respectfully urges this court to consider several 
additional factors and similar judicial authority that would lead 
to a more equitable and just interpretation of the current sta-
tute governing execution of wills in Utah. In the Editorial 
Board Comment to U.C.A. § 75-2-502, the Editorial Board stated: 
"The formalities for execution of a wit-
nessed will have been reduced to a minimum. 
Execution under this section normally would 
be accomplished by signature of the testator 
and two witnesses; each of the persons 
signing as witnesses must 'witness1 any of 
the following: the signing of the will by 
the testator, an acknowledgment by the 
testator that the signature is his, or an 
acknowledgment by the testator that the 
document is his will." (Emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated § 75-1-102 specifically defines the pur-
poses of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and rules for its 
construction. This statute states: 
"(1) This code shall be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of 
this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law 
concerning the affairs of decedents, missing 
persons, protected persons, minors, and 
incapacitated persons; 
(b) To discover and make effective 
the intent of a decedent in distribution 
of his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient 
system for administering the estate of the 
decedent in making distribution to his 
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successors; 
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement 
of certain trusts; and 
(e) To make uniform the law among the 
various jurisdictions." (Emphasis added). 
The case of In Re Alexander's Estatef supray is a 1943 case, 
decided long before the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
or the initial drafting of the Utah Uniform Probate Code itself. 
The court did not, therefore, attempt to construe the present 
Utah Uniform Probate Code. In that case, the testatrix1 will was 
declared invalid where the testatrix had not signed the will in 
the presence of the witnesses, as strictly required by statute, 
but she had definitely acknowledged to the witnesses that the 
instrument was her will. This decision was a very close 3-2 
decision with Justices Wade and Moffat dissenting. In his 
dissenting opintion, Justice Wade stressed the importance of 
another Utah statute which provided that the statutes of this 
state be construed liberally and in a manner to promote justice. 
139 P«2d at 434. Justice Wade, in reviewing the facts of the 
Alexander case, stated that although the testatrix had failed to 
comply strictly with the statutory requirements, she clearly 
thought she had made a valid will and desired disposition of her 
property according to her purported will. He then concluded: 
"The legislative intent that our statutes 
shall be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice". . . was undoubtedly 
enacted to prevent the harsh results of 
following to literally the exact wording 
of the statutes, and, to my mind, was made 
for just such a case as we have here." 
139 P.2d at 434 
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As previously stated, U.C.A. § 75-1-102 specifically 
requires that the provisions of that Utah Uniform Probate Code be 
liberally construed and applied to promote the Code's underlying 
purposes. One of the specific underlying purposes and policies 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is "to discover and make effec-
tive the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." 
A liberal construction of U.C.A. § 75-2-502 is warranted given 
the specific purposes of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and the 
facts of this case. 
Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions with 
regard to substantial compliance and liberal construction as set 
out in Justice Wade's dissent. In In Re Rudd's Estate, 369 P.2d 
526 (1962), the Montana Supreme Court, interpreting a similar 
wills statute stated: 
"This court has held that the right to make 
a will depends upon the consent of the 
legislature and there must be strict com-
pliance with the statute, but we have also 
declared that substantial compliance with 
the statute is sufficient." 
369 P.2d at 530. 
The Montana Court also defined "substantial compliance" to mean 
"only that a court should determine whether the statute has been 
followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it 
was adopted. The intent of the legislation being the elimination 
of fraud." 
I n
 In Re Estate Of Perkins, 504 P.2d 564 (1972), the Supreme 
Court of Kansas interpreted the requirements set out in the 
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Kansas statute regarding the execution and attestation of testa-
mentary documents. In that case, at page 568f the court stated: 
"The will of the testator should be carried 
out if reasonably possible and a substantial 
compliance with statutory requirements is 
enough. Slight or trifling departures from 
technical requirements will not operate to 
defeat a will." Citing Kitchell v. Bridgeman, 
267 P. 26. See also Hobbs v. Mahoney, 478 P.2d 
956, 958 (1970) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
adopts the 'substantial compliance doctrine;' 
literal compliance with the requisites per-
taining to the execution of a will is not 
required.)." 
It is also important to note that the provisions of U.CcA. § 
68-3-2 also require that all of the statutes in Utah be liberally 
construed. This statute states: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes 
in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish the 
laws of this state respecting the subjects 
to which they relate, and their provisions 
and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. Whenever there is any variance 
between the rules of equity and the rules 
of common law in reference to the same 
matter, the rules of equity shall prevail." 
(Emphasis added) 
This statute has also been applied with regard to the laws of 
inheritance within the State of Utah. See; In Re Garr's Estate, 
86 P. 757 (1906). 
Further support for a liberal construction of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code is found in the recent case of Estate Of 
Grossen v. Vincent, 657 P.2d 1345 (1983). There the Utah Supreme 
16 
Court considered a different section of the Probate Code, but 
stated: 
"The [strict] interpretation urged by the 
appellants would make the decedent's will 
now invalid in this state; but it could be 
admitted to probate in any other state 
which had adopted the Uniform Probate Code. 
We will not lightly ascribe an interpreta-
tion which will produce such an incongruous 
result." 
In the instant case, based upon the provisions of the 
Uniform Probate Code as set out in other jurisdictions, the June 
30, 1984 document would have been given effect. To require an 
absolute and strict compliance wich Section 75-2-502 as it now 
reads would likewise result in an "incongruous result". The pro-
vision at issue in the present case is not a provision of the 
standard Uniform Probate Code. The very purpose of the Code was 
to reduce the formalities for execution of a witnessed will to a 
minimum. 
The June 30, 1984 will and/or codicil of the decedent was 
executed in substantial compliance with the necessary requisites 
of U.C.A. § 75-2-502. The will was signed by the decedent in the 
presence of both Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine Taylor, the 
attesting witnesses. Noel Taylor witnessed the will with his 
signature in the presence of both decedent and his wife, 
Geraldine J. Taylor, the second witness. Geraldine J. Taylor 
witnessed the will with her signature in the presence of Noel, 
the other witness. There is no question that each of these wit-
nesses were present at the time decedent executed this document. 
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Therefore, each of these individuals "witnessed" the decedent's 
execution of the codicil. The only element lacking is in 
Geraldine J. Taylor's failure to sign the instrument in the pre-
sence of decedent. The requirements which were literally 
complied with are sufficient to protect against fraud and there-
fore satisfy the very purpose for which the requirements set out 
in U.C.A. § 75-2-502 are imposed. In view of the clear legisla-
tive intent that the statutes of Utah and particularly the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code be liberally construed so as to discover and 
make effective the intent of a decedent in the distribution of 
his property, the document at issue herein has clearly satisfied 
the requirements of the law. 
Plaintiff submits that the facts of this case warrant the 
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance regarding 
the execution of a testamentary document. The decedent's intent 
with regard to the cancellation of the debt owed by Wendell to 
him is absolutely clear on the face of the document. That two 
individuals witnessed his execution of the will is uncontro-
verted. The fact that the technical act of Geraldine J. Taylor 
signing the document did not take place at that time should not 
work to upset the specific intent of the decedent with regard to 
this debt. Moreover, the subsequent events involving the pur-
ported remarriage of decedent and Esther Taylor and the amendment 
of the Grant R. Taylor Trust when decedent was deathly ill and 
five days before his death, at the very least, raise a suspicion 
of fraud. 
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The Utah statute should be interpreted consistently with the 
intent of the Uniform Probate Code and with other jurisdictions 
allowing for substantial compliance. Its interpretation should 
also be consistent with U.C.A. §§ 75-1-102 and 68-3-2 providing 
for liberal construction to promote justice and equity. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS 
ATTORNEYS FEES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ACTION 
In their Motion For Attorneys Feesf Defendants allege that 
they are entitled to an award of attorneys fees due to the 
"inexcusable neglect" of Wendell's attorney. In support of this 
claim Defendants cite Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
U.C.A. § 78-27-56 (R. 119-127). 
The provisions of Rule 11 in effect at the time Wendell 
filed his Complaint in this action state in pertinent part: 
"The signature of an attorney constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief there is good ground 
to support it and that it is not interposed 
for delay. If a pleading is not signed or 
is signed with intent to defeat the purpose 
of this rule it may be stricken as sham and 
false and the action may be proceed as though 
the pleading had not been filed. For a wil-
full violation of this rule an attorney may 
be subjected to appropriate disciplinary 
action. Similar action may be taken if 
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted." 
When this action was filed, a copy of the June 30, 1984 
will/codicil which contained the signatures of only Grant R. 
Taylor and Noel M. Taylor was mistakenly attached to the 
Complaint. The signature of Geraldine J. Taylor did not appear 
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on this copy (R.6). It is this error which forms the basis of 
Defendants' claim for attorneys fees. 
The attachment by Plaintiff's counsel of the "two signature 
document", as opposed to the "three signature document", was 
inadvertent. Further, this error was corrected by Plaintiff's 
Affidavit dated November 12, 1985 wherein he stated: 
, "I have reviewed the Complaint that has been 
filed in this matter and specifically that 
June 30, 1984 'will and/or codicil' that was 
attached thereto as Exhibit A. That document 
is not a true and accurate copy of an original 
document that I have in my possession that 
bears the signatures of Grant R. Taylor, Noel 
M. Taylor and Geraldine Taylor. A true and 
accurate copy of the document is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A." (Emphasis added). 
In order for Rule 11 to be invoked, the court must find a 
"wilfull violation" of the rule. The inadvertent inclusion of 
the copy of the wrong June 30, 1984 will/codicil containing only 
the signatures of the decedent and Noel Taylor cannot be con-
sidered a "wilfull violation" of the rule. Wendell's attorney's 
signature on the original Complaint which included the mistaken 
document, cannot be said to have been completed with the intent 
to defeat the purpose of Rule 11. Further, this error was 
quickly corrected and Defendants were in no way prejudiced. 
Defendants also rely upon U.C.A. § 78-27-56 to support their 
award of attorneys fees. This statute provides: 
"In civil actions, where not otherwise pro-
vided by statute or agreement, the court may 
award reasonable attorneys fees to a pre-
vailing party if the court determines that 
the action or the defense to the action was 
.;* without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith." 
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This statute has been interpreted by this court in Cady v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (1983). In Cady, the court set out three 
requirements which must be met before attorneys fees will be 
awarded under this statute. First, the party to whom fees are to 
be awarded must prevail. Second, the court must find that the 
action or defense was "without merit". Third, the court must 
find that an action or defense was not brought or asserted in 
good faith. 
In this case, only the first requirement set out in Cady has 
been met. Defendants have prevailed on their Motion For Summary 
Judgment. The other requirements set out in Cady are not met. 
The Cady court defined the term "without merit" as; 
"Frivolous, or little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." 
Plaintiff's action is not "without merit" as that term is 
defined in Cady, supra. Wendell brought this action to enforce 
the provisions of the June 30, 1984 will/codicil and thereby 
obtain the cancellation of a substantial debt he owed to the 
decedent. The basis of this action was the June 30, 1984 
will/codicil itself and the alleged undue influence exercised 
over the decedent by the Defendants. By the very terms of the 
document the decedent himself was concerned about this exercise 
of undue influence. As previously stated in Point II of this 
Brief, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code regarding the execution of this 
document. The facts in the record of this case show a factual 
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and legal basis for Wendell's claims. The issues raised in 
Wendell's Complaint have substantial weight and importance and 
therefore cannot be considered frivolous or "without merit". 
The court in Cady also defined "good faith" as: 
1. An honest belief in the propriety of the activities 
in question; 
2. No intent to take unconscionable advantage of 
others; 
3. No intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will, hinder, delay or 
defraud others. 
In order for attorneys fees to be awarded pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78-27-56, the court stated that a party must establish a lack of 
good faith by proving that "The unsuccessful party lacked at 
least one of the good faith elements." According to Cady, there-
fore, 
" . . . not only must there be substantial evi-
dence that the claim was lacking basis in 
either law or fact and therefore frivolous, but 
there must also be sufficient evidence that the 
unsuccessful party lacked at least one of the 
good faith elements heretofore stated (citations 
omitted)." 671 P.2d at 152. 
In the Cady case, the Supreme Court found that although the 
Plaintiffs were pursuing a meritless claim that better prepara-
tion might have avoided, that conduct alone did not rise to lack 
of good faith. 
The Defendants in the case before the court contend that 
22 
because Wendell's attorney failed to attach the correct document 
to the initial Complaint in this action, he and Wendell are 
guilty of "inexcusable neglect" and therefore, bad faith. The 
attachment of the wrong will/codicil to the Complaint, however, 
was merely an inadvertent error on the part of Wendell's attor-
ney. This inadvertence alone cannot be considered to rise to the 
level of bad faith as defined by this court in Cady, supra. 
Finally, it is well settled that an award of attorneys fees 
must be based upon substantial evidence and findings of fact from 
that evidence. FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670 
(1965), Lockhart Company v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (1982), Cady_ 
v. Johnson, supra. In this case, the district court made no fin-
dings of fact whatsoever with regard to the Defendants' entitle-
ment to an award of attorneys fees, Wendell's alleged bad faith 
conduct, or the alleged lack of merit of Wendell's action. 
Without the required findings of fact, the award of attorneys 
fees to Defendants was erroneous and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment and attorneys fees for 
defendants should be reversed and this matter remanded for a full 
trial on the merits for the following reasons: Genuine issues of 
fact exist with regard to Defendants Esther and Darren Taylor's 
exercise of undue influence over the decedent immediately prior 
to his death; genuine issues of fact exist with regard to the 
decedent's competence for a period of thirty to sixty days prior 
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to his death; genuine issues of fact exist regarding Wendell's 
standing to contest decedent's August 30, 1984 will; decedent 
substantially complied with the provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code with regard to the execution of the June 30, 1984 
will/codicil; and the District Court erred in awarding the 
Defendants attorneys fees without making specific findings of 
fact with regard to the purported bad faith conduct of Wendell 
and the alleged lack of merit of his action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fjrf day of March, 1987. 
Attorney for Wendell E. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /Wday of March, I served 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief by mailing four (4) copies thereof 
by first class United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Leland S. McCullough 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84133 




L A n 1 D 1 I M 
*** 
30 June 1984 
After considerat ion 1 ree l from :.y pergonal ^uthors^in notes in hand and d i c t a t e 
the following i n s t r u c t i o n s to my broth: r „oel b<icaur.« I t r u s t tha t he v a i l follow 
my orders a f t e r my 1 ipendng deird.se. 
1 have not taken any Medication in the la t 24 hours except two ra in r i l l s 1 hr ago. 
This has very s l i g h t l y af fec t d ray legs in loco;;.otio.:. 1 re; o r t t h i s to say tha t 
I am of a c lea r ani sober r.dnd i n making the follovan:; dec l a ra t ion . 
1 have a debt owed to mo by my brother Wendell concerning his house on Sh i r ec l i f f Ln. 
i n SLC. I w i l l leave wtji my w i l l benefactors i n s t r u c t i o n s tha t a l l f inanc ia l 
ob l iga t i ons t h a t he (V/endell) has vdtit h-.e are to be cancelled at my passing. This 
statement i s my ul t imate de s i r e concerning t h i s ob l i ga t i on . 
This I do because I be l ieve t ha t i n the pres ncc of c e r t a i n peo-lo an: by t he i r 
i n s t uc t ions future v/ri t tcn negot ia t ions ..ay oe attest, t e i to be made whiin I am under 
the inf luence of medicines or coercion and n t of i.\y c l a r , f r ee , and sober d e s i r e s . 
This I deeply and pos i t ive ly beieve could or w i l l happen. 
I a l so order , i n continued sobr ie ty , tha t i f t n i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s n f t car r ied out by my 
benefac tos , as c l ea r ly a i r ec ted to then., t h a t Wendell be compensated in t r eb le for a l l 
expenses^ l e g a l and ordinary, he has incurred or v d l l incur in r e s i s t i n g the dwelling 
debt problem as wel l ai; the cancelled deb t . This I have verbal ly expressed to some. 
I handle t i l l s with you, i\»oel, and not with V/endell d i r e c t l y for personal rea. ens 
I won't expla in . Here-in i s the documentary re-stato::.ent or" t h i s o r : e r . 
Also, I handle t h i s subject t h i s way i n the hopes t ha t the pr incibpal de s i r e of l i n e 
to be consumated i s t h a t Wendell w i l l be f ree : of l i n a n c i a l obl iga t ions to me and or 
my e s t a t e . I handle i t vdtii you iioel so t h a t i f a l l goes as 1 des i re and as ins t ruc t* 
by me t h a t t n i s document be destroyed without r eve l a t i on , l suggest t o you i.oel a 
shor t period of wait ing a f t e r my passing zo present t h i s document, i f needed, in orier 
to see an accurate p ic ture of the d e v e l o c e n t s i f a :<robU-:- a r i s e s . Your .iud^.-mcfct 
i n t h i s . 
I t r u s t you IMOOI as a cour f ie r ami witness to ant Toi- t h i s o r ' e r . 
I order the above explained cance l la t ion of dent of '.venae 13. to me or to my e s t a t e 
as par t of my Fina l Wil l And Testaiacrt ani t h i s order s h a l l su- ersede any previous 
order of nine or any suusequent order of mine or an.*' .*e e lse on t h i s mat te r . 
PJ<^I 
Ly dictate, b y X ^ ^ / ^ *7' Soberly and f ree l  
Grant H. T a ^ o r 
Typed as d i c t a t ed an.i v:itnesc\i ^r 
\ool . Taylor [ / 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
Esther Taylor, personally and as personal representative of 
the Estate of Grant R. Taylor, and Darron Taylor. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH „ ^ ££? ' k'C • I 3 O <+• 
i-i'-fc ~ " ^ * * * * * * * 
WENDELL E. TAYLOR. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
THE ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR, 
deceased. ESTHER TAYLOR. 
DARRON G. TAYLOR, and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DISMISSING ACTION WITH 
PREJUDICE, AND AWARDINff 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS^FEES 
Civil No. C-85-6869 
Judge Raymond Uno 
* * * * * * * 
Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' 
Motion for Attorneys Fees came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno on Thursday, February 20, 1986, at 
8:00 o'clock a.m. Defendants were represented by Leland S. 
McCullough, Esq. and P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq. Plaintiff was 
represented by Stanley S. Adams, Esq. Based upon the Memoranda 
i^UY?'?*^ 
filed herein, arguments of counsel, the Affidavit of P. Bryan 
Fishburn as to attorneys fees, and good cause appearing, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted; 
2. That this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
and 
3* That Plaintiff is to pay to Defendants their 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending against this 
action, such fees having been determined by the Court to be in 
the amount of $ Z> , f * * ' c . 
y^V ir /J & * 
DATED S "• * / . 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
c-J ( v / -66c 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Third District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
CDN0643F H. DIXON HINDLEY 
- 2 «yVA.^ , •:; •• • ' • ' ^ ^ r ^ ^ f e r 
U-C.-'-i-^ :t» 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE. AND AWARDING 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES was hand delivered this day of 
j j I /i i j" ( i 1986, to the following: 
Stanley S. Adams, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
521 6th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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Rule 56. Summary Judgment 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the com-
mencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(c) was amended by the Supreme Court on 
June 30, 1965, effective October 1, 1965. The amendment inserted "an-
swers to interrogatories" in the third sentence. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evi-
dence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts *re actually and in good faith contro-
verted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts 
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent 
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
I l l 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for sum-
mary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, sum-
mary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(e) was amended by the Supreme Court 
on June 30, 1965, effective October 1, 1965. The amendment added the 
words "Defense Required" in the caption, inserted "answers to interroga-
tories" after "depositions" and deleted the word "by" before "further 
affidavits" in the third sentence, and added the last two sentences. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits pre-
sented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay* the court shall forthwith order the party 
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him 
to incur, reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings 
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed in his individual name by at least one attorney who 
is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The address of 
the attorney and that of the party shall be stated. Every party 
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleadings 
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically pro-
vided by rule, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by 
an affidavit. The signature of any attorney constitutes a certifi-
cate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to sup-
port it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not 
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule 
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed 
as though the pleading had not been filed. For a wilful violation 
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate discipli-
nary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or inde-
cent matter is inserted. 
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CONSTRUCTION 68-3-2 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally 
construed — Rules of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489; 
C.L. 1917, § 5839; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
88-2-2. 
Cross-References. — One form of civil ac-
tion; law and equity administered in same ac-
tion, Utah Const, Art. VHI, Sec. 19; Rule 2, 
U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Actions against state. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Bastardy proceedings. 
Decisions of foreign courts. 
Garnishment proceedings. 
Inheritance laws. 
Liability of city. 
Life insurance. 
Penal statutes. 
Questions of novel impression. 
Remedial statutes. 
Rules of equity prevail. 
— Forfeitures. 
Statutes of foreign states. 
Worker's compensation. 
In general. 
This section abrogates the common-law rule. 
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 
<1906>; State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 432, 226 P. 
904 (1924). 
This section is mandatory. Hammond v. 
Wall 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918). 
Where a statute charges one with a duty or 
imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so 
with sufficient clarity that one of ordinary in-
telligence will understand what he is required 
to do, and. in case of alternative choices, he can 
comply by selecting the one least burdensome 
to him. Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 
P.2d 943 (1959). 
Statutes are to be liberally construed to give 
effect to their purpose and promote justice but 
they are not to be distorted beyond the intent 
of the legislature. Stanton Transp. Co. v. 
Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959). 
Actions against state. 
Statute giving right to sue the state must be 
construed so as to give effect to intent of the 
Legislature. There must be substantial compli-
ance with the designated statutory procedure 
for bringing such actions. State v. District 
Court, 102 Utah 284, 115 P.2d 913 (1941); 102 
Utah 290, 128 P.2d 471 (1942). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Seemingly, clause of this section, which re-
quires provisions of statutes and proceedings 
under them to be liberally construed with view 
to effect statutes' objects and to promote jus-
tice, applies, at least in matter of amendment 
of pleading, as well when it is statutes of an-
other state, as when it is statutes of Utah, 
which are involved. Pugmire v. Diamond Coal 
& Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 P. 385 (1903) 
(decided under prior law). 
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75-1-102. Purposes—Rule of construction.—(1) This code shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of dece-
dents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated 
persons; 
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distri-
bution of his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the 
estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors; 
SHORT TITLE, CONSTRUCTION, GENERAL PROVISIONS 75-1-106 
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and 
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
History: G 1953, 75-1-102, enacted 95 C.J.S. Wills § 308. 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 2. 79 Am. Jur 2d 880, WiUs § 827.
 # 
J
 Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic 
Collateral References. Service, Uniform Probate Code. 
Wills<5=>203. 
DEFINITIONS 75-1-201 
(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, 
creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or 
claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or pro-
tected person which may be affected by the proceeding. It also includes 
persons having priority for appointment as personal representative and 
other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it 
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be de-
termined according to the particular purposes of, and matters involved 
in, any proceeding. 
75-2-502. Execution.—Except as provided for holographic wills, writ-
ings within section 75-2-513, and wills within section 75-2-506, every 
will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name 
by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and 
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either 
the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the 
will The signing by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence 
and in the presence of each other. 
Cross-References. 
Probate and administration, 75-3-101 
et seq. 
Proof of will, 78-25-12. 
Collateral References. 
Wills<3=nil, 113-123. 
94 C J.S. Wills §§ 169-177,182-197. 
79 Am. Jur. 2d 430, Wills § 210. 
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic 
Service, Uniform Probate Code. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-502, enacted 
by L, 1975, ch. 150, §3 . 
Editorial Board Comment. 
The formalities for execution of a wit-
nessed will have been reduced to a mini-
mum. Execution under this section nor-
mally would be accomplished by signa-
ture of the testator and of two witnesses; 
each of the persons signing as witnesses 
must "witness" any of the following: 
the signing of the will by the testator, 
an acknowledgment by the testator that 
the signature is his, or an acknowledg-
ment by the testator that the document 
is his will. Signing by the testator may 
be by mark under general rules relating 
to what constitutes a signature; or the 
will may be signed on behalf of the 
testator by another person signing the 
testator's name at his direction and in 
his presence. There is no requirement 
that the testator publish the document 
as his will, or that he request the wit-
nesses to sign, or that the witnesses 
sijrn in the presence of the testator or of 
each other. The testator may sign the 
will outside the presence of the witnesses 
if he later acknowledges to the witnesses 
that the signature is his or that the docu-
ment is his will, and they sign as wit-
nesses. [Last sentence in Utah version 
omitted in official text of Code.] There 
is no requirement that the testator's 
signature be at the end of the will; thus, 
if he writes his name in the body of 
the will and intends it to be his signa-
ture, this would satisfy the statute. The 
intent is to validate wills which meet 
the minimal formalities of the statute. 
A will which does not meet these re-
quirements may be valid under section 
75-2-503 as a holograph. 
Admissibility and credibility of testi-
mony of subscribing witness tending to 
impeach execution of will or testamen-
tary capacity of testator, 79 A. L. R. 
394. 
Admissibility of evidence other than 
testimony of subscribing witnesses to 
prove due execution of will, or testa-
mentary capacity, 63 A. L. R. 1195. 
Admissibility of testator's declarations 
upon issue of genuineness or due execu-
tion of purported will, 62 A. L. R. 2d 
855. 
Assistance: validity of will signed by 
testator with the assistance of another, 
98 A. L. R. 2d 824. 
"Attestation" or "witnessing" of will, 
required by statute, as including wit-
nesses' subscription, 45 A. L. R. 2d 1365. 
Beneficiary under nuncupative will as 
witness thereto, 28 A. L. R. 2d 796. 
Character as w i t n e s s of one who 
signed will for another purpose, 8 A. L 
R. 1075. 
Character of instrument as will, or its 
admissibility to probate as such, as af-
fected by its failure to make any dis-
position of property or by fact that 
there is no beneficiary entitled to take 
thereunder, 147 A. L. R. 636. 
Codicil as affecting application of stat-
utory provision to will, or previous codi-
cil not otherwise subject, or as obviating 
objections to lack of testamentary ca-
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-57 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, 
the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1. 
Meaning of "without merit'* and "good 
faith." 
A frivolous action having no basis in law or 
fact is "without merit/' but is nevertheless in 
"good faith" as long as there is an honest be-
lief that it is appropriate, and as long as 
there is no intent to hinder, delay, defraud or 
take advantage of another. Cady v. Johnson 
(1983) 671 P 2d 149. 
Law Reviews. — Attorney's Fees in Utah, 
1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Merit less Ac-
tions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593. 
